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To have my book, In Defense ofthe Land Ethic,so 
thoroughly and perceptively reviewed by so eminent a 
philosopher as Kristin Shrader-Frechette flatters me. 
~""" Before I say another word, I want to thank her for her 
comments, both critical and complimentary, and 
especially for defending my environmental phil~y 
against Tom Regan's importunate charge that It IS 
tantamount to " environmental fascism." I also thank 
Between the Species for giving me the opportunity to 
append a reply to Shrader-Frechette's review. Generally 
put, here it is: All of the complimentary things she says 
about the book are true and all the critical things false. 
No...seriously...Schrader-Frechette has for the most 
part accurately summarized my theory ofenvironmental 
ethics and then turned her fonnidable powers of critical 
argument against views that I do not hold (as she tacitly 
acknowledges: "Callicott and others" is the tip-off 
phrase). She has, in short, come to this forum to praise 
my philosophy and to bury that of others under a 
headstone on which she has carved only my name. 
There is one exception to this general tack that I take 
in my rejoinder. As much as I would like to accept credit 
for "poetic brilliance," I must adjure the compliment. 
Holmes Rolston, whose words have recently graced the 
pages of this journal, is, as every one knows, the poet 
laureate ofenvironmental philosophy. "Poetic" suggests 
the associative ambiguity and concrete imagery that 
characterize his luxuriant prose. I strive for just the 
opposite effect, for univocal and precise abstract 
expression (although, ancillary to that, I will confess to 
striving also for a lively and readable style). Praising 
my work as poetic foreshadows Shrader-Frechette's 
inclination in the latter half of her review to attack the 
arguments as if they were mine. 
In the limited space at my disposal, let me take up 
Shrader-Frechette's principal critical points in tum and 
set the record straight. 
Shrader-Frechette agrees with me that "the 
community concept is essential to the notion of moral 
obligation," but-because biotic communities are ill­
defined, overlap, and change-she insists that "there is 
no biologically coherent notion of 'community' robust 
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enough... to ground environmental ethics." The concept 
of a human community, however, is no more coherent 
and robust. By "community" one may refer equally 
well to a group of people united by proximity 
(neighbors), by ethnicity (Hmong refugees), or by 
religion (the community of faith); to a group of 
businesses (the banking community); or to a group of 
countries (the European Economic Community). And 
communities change. The EC, for example, is growing 
while COMECON is shrinking. Sociologists describe 
and theoretically relate ill-defined, overlapping, and 
changing human communities. Ecologists likewise 
identify biotic communities of various types and sizes 
(ponds, marshes, forests, savannahs, blndras, and so on). 
And there is a new and powerful body of theory­
hierarchy theory-in ecology devoted to their complex, 
many-tiered interrelationships and interactions. So, if 
the concept of a human community is coherent and 
robust enough to support anthropocentric moral 
obligations, as Shrader-Frechette conceded, then the 
concept ofa biotic community-since no less coherent 
and robust-is coherent and robust enough to support 
ecocentric moral obligations. 
Nowhere do I attempt to "safeguard the interests of 
biological communities" as Shrader-Frechette suggests 
that I do. I do not think that biological communities 
have "interests" or, for that matter, that interest­
safeguarding is the be-all and end-all ofethics. Rather, 
I argue that biotic communities per se are "morally 
considerable," but not by appeaI either to a static "balance 
of nature" or to "the diversity-stability hypothesis," as 
Shrader-Frechette also alleges. Aldo Leopold, whose 
seminal land ethic I elaborate and defend in my book, 
specifically rejected the "balance of nature" metaphor 
in favor of Charles Elton's trophic pyramid ecological 
paradigm. He was, furthermore, for his time, 
remarkably cautious and circumspect about the 
dependence of stability on diversity. And I am keenly 
aware that a quarter cenblry after Leopold's death the 
diversity-stability hypothesis became a theoretical 
pariah in ecology. 
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This time, I suspect, it is Bryan Norton with whom 
I am being confused. Norton has recklessly entered 
the scientific debate about the diversity-stability 
hypothesis and defends a verion of it in his effort to 
provide moral support for the preservation of species. 
But I try assiduously to avoid holding my environmental 
ethics hostage to any particular ecological claim. 
Rather, I argue that ecology is transforming our world 
view. Whatever the scientific status of this or that 
ecological hypothesis, ecology focuses on the 
relationships between organisms and their environmenlS. 
Attention to relationships engenders a systemic, holistic 
conception of nature which appeals, I argue further, to 
our innate moral sensibilities. Actually, I proceed 
exactly as Shrader-Frechette concludes that we 
environmental philosophers should. I rest my ethical 
case on a scientifically informed metaphysics, not on 
specific scientific hypotheses. (In fact, one ofmy essays 
in the very book: under review is entitled "The 
Metaphysical Implications of Ecology.") 
Shrader-Frechette's critique of my evolutionary 
construction of ethics is hard for me to understand, let 
alone rebut That is because she saddles me with an 
ethical permutation of "evolutionary epistemology"­
something with which I am wholly unacquainted and 
certainly upon which I do not model my evolutionary 
account of ethics. Her most fundamental misrepresen­
tation of my evolutionary account of ethics is her 
assumption that I treat ethics (just as the evolutionary 
epistemologists treat lcnowledge, Iguess) as analogous 
to evolution ("the ethics: evolution analogy'). But I 
nowhere suggest that ethics and evolution are analogous. 
Rather I endorse Darwin's simple and straightforward 
evolutionary argument that we current editions ofHomo 
sapiens inherit tender and refined but indeterminate 
"moral sentiments" (as, following Hume and Smith, he 
called them) because the inclusive fitness of our 
protohuman ancestors was enhanced by social 
integration, which mutual moral restraint enabled them 
to achieve. 1be moral sentiments however are not blind, 
unerring instincts; they are open-ended feelings lik:e 
sympathy, good will, beneficence, and so on. I argue, 
accordingly, that nature (evolution) outfits us with a 
plastic capacity for ethics but that to whom we owe 
what is shaped by nurture (culture). I quite agree, nay, 
I would indeed be the first to insist that our altruistic 
feelings must be informed by "hypotheses about the 
facts" and by "cognitive and evaluative aims" to be both 
actual and properly ethical. After all, what I am basically 
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arguing is that ecology represents plants and animals, 
soils and waters as our fellow-members of biotic 
communities. Thus we ought to feel sympathy for and 
good will toward them and toward the community per 
se (however narrowly or broadly bounded). 
Shrader-Frechette claims that my theory of 
environmental ethics is not nonnative. She is right, ifby 
"nonnative" one means rationally coercive. If one 
think:s of normative ethics as Kant did-as (good) 
reason preventing people from doing what their (bad) 
feelings incline them to do-then my environmental 
ethic will certainly appear to be more descriptive than 
nonnative. But the environmental ethic that I defend in 
In Defense is "nonnative" in anothtt sense. ''98.6 degrees 
Fahrenheit" both describes the usual temperature of 
healthy human bodies and provides a norm against which 
we measure deviations-fever and hypothermia. In my 
view (and here I intend to draw an analogy), moral 
norms are to human psychology as medical norms are to 
human anatomy and physiology-with one important 
difference: they are open to cognitive information, as I 
just explained. 
Ecology has not so far provided objective norms of 
ecosystemic health analogous to the objective norms 
of organic health provided by modern medicine. 
Shrader-Frechette is right about that. Absent such 
norms, environmentalists have measured ecologic 
perturbations against a gross and static historical 
criterion, "wilderness," the state of nature prior to the 
evolution or arrival of the subspecies Homo sapiens 
europi. And Shrader-Frechette is also right to point out 
that this is incoherent, because change is a natural 
condition of ecosystems. I might also add that human 
beings are natural creatures, an equally pertinent fact that 
Shrader-Frechette (pointedly?) omits to mention. We 
are merely one species-though to be sure, one very 
precocious species-among millions of others. 
Anthropogenic change is therefore as natural as any 
other. But because ecology does not provide us with 
objective dynamic noons of ecosystemic health, must 
weabandon all hope ofan ecology-based environmental 
ethic? I think: not; and I submit that in arguing to the 
contrary Shrader-Frechette commits the fallacy of 
Argumentum ad Ignorantum. Because nineteenth­
century medicine was unable to provide norms of 
organic health, should we have abandoned all hope of 
a science-based medicine and settled for, say, the healing 
power of prayer? Twentieth-century ecology is as 
immature as nineteenth-century medicine. One of the 
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most fruitful and important research opportunities for 
twenty-first century ecology is the development of 
objective norms for the health of dynamic ecosystems. 
Once formulated, such norms might tentatively 
govern our environmental behavior. Ecology will never 
be a science more exact than medicine. So we should 
always be prepared to change our notions of what is 
good for nature, just as we are prepared to change our 
notions of what is good for our bodies. But again, 
environmentalphilosophy should not concern itself with 
formulating and reformulating specific norms of 
environmental health and integrity. That is a job for 
ecologists. We philosophers should busy ourselves, 
rather, with connecting ecological "facts" (Le., 
ecological hypotheses and theories) with values, and 
with trying to show, as I do in my book, that it is no less 
incumbent upon us to be solicitous of the health and 
integrity (however tentatively defmed) of (changing, 
evolving) biotic communities than of the health and 
integrity of (changing, aging) human persons and of 
(changing, developing) human societies. 
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Professor Callicott's reply to my analysis of his 
claims reminds me of my favorite philosophical 
exchange, a conversation penned by Lewis Carroll. 
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said to Alice, 
"it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more 
nor less." But, as Alice reminded him, "The question 
is ...whether you can make words mean so many 
different things."I This is precisely my question to 
Professor Callicott. Can you make words-like 
"evolution," "community," and "norm,"-mean so 
many different things, claiming one meaning in one 
argument, and an incompatible meaning in another? 
In his "Reply," Professor Callicott states: "I nowhere 
suggest that ethics and evolution are analogous." Yet., 
as I quoted in my review, Callicott claims: The 
"conceptual and logical foundations of the land ethic" 
are a "Darwinian protosociobiological natural history 
of ethics, Darwinian ties of kinship among all forms of 
life on earth.... Its logic is that natural selection has 
endowed human beings with an affective moral 
response to perceived bonds ofkinship and community 
membership and identity."2 Value "in the philosophical 
sense," says Callicott, "is a newly discovered proper 
object of a specially evolved "publick affection" or 
"moral sense" which all psychologically normal human 
beings have inherited from a long line of primates."3 It 
is logically inconsistent for Callicott to claim that 
evolution and natural selection provide the foundations 
of the land ethic, then, once someone points out the 
problematic logical consequences of this position, to 
deny espousing evolutionary ethics. 
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